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Abstract 
In this paper we reexamine several experimental papers on myopic loss aversion by 
analyzing individual rather than aggregate choice patterns. We find that the behavior of 
the majority of subjects is inconsistent with the hypothesis of myopic loss aversion. 
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Myopic Loss Aversion Revisited 
1. Introduction 
Myopic loss aversion (MLA) refers to a combination of greater sensitivity to 
losses than to gains (loss aversion) and a tendency to evaluate outcomes frequently 
(mental accounting) e.g. Thaler et al. (1997). Benartzi and Thaler (1995) proposed MLA 
as an explanation for the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). However, 
Durand et al. (2004) showed that the analysis of Benartzi and Thaler (1995) is not robust. 
In a similar vein, Fielding and Stracca (2006) find that MLA can explain historical equity 
premium only if investors have highly short-sighted evaluation period.  
Given these recent findings that macroeconomic simulations of equity premium 
puzzle do not appear to be consistent with MLA hypothesis, this papers takes a closer 
look at the experimental evidence in support of MLA. Thaler et al. (1997), Gneezy and 
Potters (1997), Gneezy et al. (2003), Langer and Weber (2005), Haigh and List (2005) 
and Bellemare et al. (2005) all find that, on average, subjects bet significantly higher 
amounts on a risky lottery when its performance is assessed over a relatively long time 
period. Thus, aggregate choice patterns observed in the above mentioned experiments 
appear to be in support of MLA. However, this paper shows that the majority of 
individual choice patterns in several of these experiments are actually inconsistent with 
MLA hypothesis. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
experimental design of Gneezy and Potters (1997), which was subsequently replicated 
(with additional treatments) by Langer and Weber (2005), Haigh and List (2005) and 
Bellemare et al. (2005). Section 3 reexamines the experimental results and shows that the 
majority of subjects exhibit behavior inconsistent with MLA. Section 4 concludes. 
 3
2. Experimental design 
Gneezy and Potters (1997) ask subjects to bet any part x of their initial endowment 
on a risky lottery that yields –x with probability 2/3 and 2.5x with probability 1/3. 
Subjects are randomly assigned to one of the two experimental treatments. In treatment 
H, subjects make investment decisions in 9 rounds. In rounds 2-9 subjects observe the 
outcome of the lottery realized in the previous round. In treatment L, subjects make 
investment decisions only in round t5{1,4,7}. The level of investment chosen in round t 
remains constant in rounds t, t+1 and t+2. In rounds 4 and 7 subjects observe cumulative 
outcome of the lottery from previous three rounds. In both treatments subjects receive a 
new initial endowment at the beginning of every period (irrespective of past earnings).  
Langer and Weber (2005), Haigh and List (2005) and Bellemare et al. (2005) 
replicated the experiment of Gneezy and Potters (1997) and made several modifications 
to their design. Langer and Weber (2005) increased the number of rounds from 9 to 18 
and used two other risky lotteries for which they did not find evidence of MLA. Haigh 
and List (2005) conducted a field experiment with professional traders from the Chicago 
Board of Trade. Bellemare et al. (2005) used an additional treatment identical to treatment 
L except that subjects observed the realization of the risky lottery in every period (betting 
behavior in this treatment was not significantly different from that in treatment H).  
3. Reexamination of experimental results 
Tables 1 and 2 show that the majority of subjects in the experiments of Gneezy 
and Potters (1997), Langer and Weber (2005) and Haigh and List (2005) exhibit the same 
individual choice patterns, both in treatment H and treatment L. In the majority of 
experimental rounds they invest an intermediate fraction of their initial endowment. Only 
a handful of subjects abstain from betting on the risky lottery and 12%-22% (15%-37%) 
of subjects consistently bet all their endowment on the risky lottery in treatment H (L). 
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Individual choice pattern  
in the majority of rounds1 













Invest 100% of endowment  7 (17.1 %) 2 (12.5%) 5 (15.7 %) 6 (22.2 %) 
Invest 1%-99% of endowment  27 (65.8 %) 13 (81.2%) 25 (78.1 %) 17 (63.0 %) 
Invest 0% of endowment  4 (9.8 %) 1 (6.3%) 1 (3.1 %) 2 (7.4 %) 
Other 3 (7.3 %) 0 (0.0%) 1 (3.1 %) 2 (7.4 %) 
Table 1 Individual choice patterns observed in Treatment H 
Individual choice pattern  
in the majority of rounds 













Invest 100% of endowment  15 (35.7 %) 3 (15.0%) 6 (18.8 %) 10 (37.0 %) 
Invest 1%-99% of endowment  27 (64.3 %) 17 (85.0%) 26 (81.2 %) 17 (63.0 %) 
Invest 0% of endowment  0 (0.0 %) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0 %) 0 (0.0 %) 
Table 2  Individual choice patterns observed in Treatment L 
Let us now focus on subjects who consistently bet an intermediate fraction of 
their endowment on the risky lottery. Table 3 shows that their intermediate bets are not 
significantly different across two treatments in all experiments with an exception of field 
experiment of Haigh and List (2005) with professional traders. We will now demonstrate 
that such behavior is inconsistent with the hypothesis of MLA. 
The prediction of MLA is based on a deterministic decision theory proposed by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992). According to their cumulative prospect theory, an 
individual derives utility from changes in wealth, which is captured by the value function 
( ) αxxv =  if 0≥x  and ( ) ( )βλ xxv −−=  if 0<x . Coefficient 0>λ  is the index of loss 
aversion (e.g. Köbberling and Wakker (2005)) and coefficients α  and β , that capture 
diminishing sensitivity to gains and losses, are estimated to be both equal to 0.88.  
                                                 
1 Majority is defined as 5 rounds for experiments of Gneezy and Potters (1997) and Haigh and List (2005) 
and 10 rounds for the experiment of Langer and Weber (2005). 
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Rounds 
Average percentage of endowment bet 
(standard deviation) Mann-Whitney 
statistic (p-value) 
Treatment H Treatment L 
Gneezy and Potters (1997) 
Rounds 1-3 43.71 (15.74) 50.00 (21.68) -0.8118 (0.4169) 
Rounds 4-6 37.69 (19.74) 43.52 (16.34) -1.2893 (0.1973) 
Rounds 7-9 45.40 (19.25) 56.24 (25.55) -1.3390 (0.1806) 
Rounds 1-9 42.27 (15.58) 49.92 (16.54) -1.7436 (0.0812) 
Langer and Weber (2005) 
Rounds 1-6 39.87 (24.29) 49.56 (16.49) -1.5293 (0.1262) 
Rounds 7-12 39.87 (23.51) 52.94 (22.56) -1.3404 (0.1801) 
Rounds 13-18 41.54 (26.38) 56.18 (25.71) -1.3404 (0.1801) 
Rounds 1-18 40.43 (22.65) 52.89 (19.56) -1.6744 (0.0940) 
Haigh and List (2005), students 
Rounds 1-3 34.88 (20.49) 49.72 (21.59) -2.5758 (0.0100) 
Rounds 4-6 46.13 (22.63) 52.28 (20.04) -0.9641 (0.3350) 
Rounds 7-9 55.07 (25.02) 59.40 (23.61) -0.6804 (0.4962) 
Rounds 1-9 45.36 (19.23) 53.80 (19.64) -1.5922 (0.1113) 
Haigh and List (2005), professional traders 
Rounds 1-3 33.18 (23.69) 51.94 (21.90) -2.3850 (0.0171) 
Rounds 4-6 27.98 (17.41) 60.69 (19.46) -3.8802 (0.0001) 
Rounds 7-9 38.39 (26.28) 70.47 (22.31) -3.2629 (0.0011) 
Rounds 1-9 33.18 (19.19) 61.03 (19.25) -3.5493 (0.0004) 
Table 3 Average percentage of initial endowment invested in the risky lottery in 
treatments H and L by subjects who bet only intermediate fraction of their 
endowment in the majority of experimental rounds 
An individual who invests nothing into the risky lottery obtains zero utility in 
both treatments. An individual betting amount x  on the lottery in treatment H gets utility 
(1)              ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )32315.2 −+ −= wxwxxU H βα λ  
where ( ) ( )( ) γγγγ 11 ppppw −+=+  and ( ) ( )( ) δγδδ 11 ppppw −+=−  are the probability 
weighing functions for gains and losses respectively ( [ ]1,0∈p  and coefficients 0>γ  and 
0>δ  are estimated to be 0.61 and 0.69 correspondingly).  
An individual betting amount x  on the risky lottery in treatment L obtains utility 
















Notice that when βα = , an individual bets nothing on the risky lottery in treatment H if 
her index of loss aversion λ  is greater than λ  (in this case ( ) 0<xU H ). An individual 
bets all her initial endowment on the risky lottery if λλ <  ( ( ) 0>xU H ). Finally, an 
individual is exactly indifferent between betting and not betting (i.e. she can invest any 
fraction of her endowment in the risky lottery) if λλ =  ( ( ) 0=xU H ). Similar prediction 
holds for treatment L with the threshold for index of loss aversion being λ  instead of λ . 
For conventional parameterizations of cumulative prospect theory ratio λ  is 
smaller than ratio λ . For example, 33.1≈λ  and 66.1≈λ  for parameters estimated by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992).2 Therefore, individual betting behavior in treatments H 
and L, which is consistent with the hypothesis of MLA, can be organized in the following 
Table 4 (depending on the unobservable index of loss aversion). 
Index of loss aversion λ  λλ <  λλ =  λλλ << λλ =  λλ >  
Betting on the risky 
lottery in treatment H everything anything nothing nothing nothing 
Betting on the risky 
lottery in treatment L everything everything everything anything nothing 
Table 4 Predicted behavior in treatments H and L according to MLA  
In terms of the between-subject design of Gneezy and Potters (1997), Table 4 has 
the following testable implications: 
A. Percentage of subjects, who bet all their endowment on the risky lottery, is higher in 
treatment L than in treatment H;  
                                                 
2 Gneezy and Potters (1997), Gneezy et a. (2003) and Haigh and List (2005) considered a simplified 
version of cumulative prospect theory without non-linear probability weighting ( 1== δγ ) and with a 
piecewise linear value function ( 1== βα ). In this case 25.1=λ  and 56.1≈λ . 
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B. Percentage of subjects, who abstain from betting, is higher in treatment H than in L;  
C. Percentage of subjects, who bet all their endowment in treatment L, is higher than the 
percentage of subjects, who bet an intermediate fraction of endowment in treatment H; 
D. Percentage of subjects, who bet nothing in treatment H, is higher than the percentage 
of subjects, who bet an intermediate fraction of their endowment in treatment L. 
Tables 1 and 2 show that while implications A and B of MLA are confirmed for 
all experiments, implications C and D of MLA are clearly violated. In all experiments the 
majority of subjects decide to bet an intermediate fraction of their endowment on the 
risky lottery. The fraction of subjects who consistently bet an intermediate fraction of 
their endowment is nearly identical across two treatments (ranging between 65% and 
85% across different experiments) and their intermediate bets are not significantly 
different across two treatments (except for the field experiment of Haigh and List (2005)).  
MLA can explain this finding only if ratios λ  and λ  happen to be equal for the 
majority of subjects in both treatments. However, for the equality λλ =  to hold, we need 
to assume unconventional parameterizations of cumulative prospect theory (in particular, 
γδ < ), which contradicts to the existing experimental evidence (e.g. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992), Abdellaoui (2000)). Moreover, if λλ = , then MLA cannot explain 
implications A and B that apparently lead to statistically significant difference between 
aggregate choice patterns in treatments H and L. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we reexamine the experimental evidence on risk taking and 
evaluation periods, provided by Gneezy and Potters (1997), Langer and Weber (2005) 
and Haigh and List (2005). A close look at the data suggests that behavioral patterns of 
the majority of subjects contradict to the MLA explanation. Subjects not only invest 
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intermediate fractions of their endowment, but also these intermediate bets do not appear 
to vary greatly across treatments with different length of evaluation period.  
Our results suggest two important messages. First, experiments on risk taking and 
evaluation periods may reflect other phenomena than MLA. Some experimental evidence 
in support of the assumption of loss aversion of prospect theory has already been called 
into question by Plott and Zeiler (2005, 2006). They found that asymmetries in exchange 
behavior initially interpreted as evidence of endowment effect predicted by loss aversion 
are actually caused by subject misconceptions about the experimental procedure.  
The second message is that the question of comparing expected utility theory and 
MLA approaches in the laboratory remains unanswered. While many attempts have been 
made to create an appropriate procedure, current experimental algorithms fail to 
discriminate between the two alternatives. It is left to further research to design an 
experiment, which would test expected utility theory versus MLA.  
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